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Speculation 
 
Can animals paint? Are elephants artists? Or dogs? To be sure, we are not proposing a Zen 
conundrum, but a concrete question that arose after people were able to observe… animals 
painting. “Can animals paint?” is therefore an awkward question, precisely because they have 
been observed to do so! See the many videos on the internet, or go to a place where you can 
observe it yourself. However, the full scope of the question – the scope that makes for 
controversial debates – is: can animals really paint? And, in telescopic fashion, this question 
again transports even more precise and pressing issues: can animals really paint as a function 
of their own intention and artistic creativity? Are animals like human artists? Do they master 
and own their work? The debates about these elephants, dogs and dolphins - like many debates 
about things we do not know much about - are founded upon the opposition between the 
miraculous (they are natural born artists!) versus debunking (it is only the trainer guiding the 
animals through gentle strokes and other subtle cues). Put in such terms, the debate offers only 
two alternatives, both of which are, when you think about it, equally uninteresting: a dubious 
promotion for animals to the status of near-humanity; or a disenchanting explanation of the 
facts behind the painting illusion. Ethologist and empirical philosopher Vinciane Despret 
(2016) thinks that both alternatives are unengaging and uninteresting, as they simply extend 
existing frameworks of how we think about humanity, and about animals as the horizon of 
species against which humanity defines itself. But what would you expect for an answer, if you 
are asking bad questions? A bad question, for Despret, implies that new ways of thinking about 
an issue are excluded because of the very question youare asking. Despret evaluates questions 
in terms of their consequences for thinking: if a question merely extends the terms of what we 
already think we know, then what is the point in asking it? The answer is already there. 
Therefore, Despret offers no ‘third way’ between miracles versus illusions, but changes the 
question and the framework altogether. She slows down and allows for a moment of perplexity: 
isn’t it very strange that the initial experience of amazement towards a situation becomes 
systematically re-examined as being justified (in case an expert voice concludes that animals 
are natural born geniuses) or not justified (if an expert concludes that it is only the trainer 
guiding an obedient animal)? Isn’t the fear of being ‘duped’ in the face of an illusion very 
peculiar, as it makes our experience of perplexity and amazement depend upon an authorization 
that we are ‘in our right’ to be perplexed and amazed? Despret remarks that spectators know 
very well that the painting is not the animal’s own original idea, and that the animal needs help 
in achieving the artwork. This is precisely the point: the spectators witness a situation in which 
humans and animals achieve something together. That is a new starting point leading to very 
different questions and lines of thought. No longer obsessed with the question whether what 
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we are witnessing is really real, we can now inquire into what makes a particular achievement 
possible; how humans and animals can collaborate; how humans and animals can mutually 
learn; how learning situations can be created without coercion, etc. Asking what makes up a 
situation, the elements it is composed of and how it is composed, means inquiring into the 
consequences and further developments of that situation. And thinking those consequences in 
return requires that we reconsider what elements matter in the initial situation. That is 
speculation, and it becomes clear that speculation is not merely abstract thinking (as the term 
might convey) but that it requires keeping in touch with the empirical. Yet, it is a peculiar form 
of empiricism in that what is ‘empirical’ – or what is given in an experience or a situation - is 
not taken for granted but part of the question. This necessary connection between thought and 
the empirical constrains and defines speculative thinking. Early-20th-Century philosopher A.N. 
Whitehead wrote that such constraints are productive and necessary to think creatively. 
(Debaise 2006) Speculation, then, is not ‘free of charge.’ To speculate may indeed convey 
something of a cozy artistic brainstorm but this is a misleading image of speculation and of 
artistic work. Just like artistic work (including animals painting), speculation requires training 
and conceptual clarity in the light of specific constraints. In defining speculation, A.N. 
Whitehead insists on these constraints, such as the relation to the empirical and the proper use 
of rationality. For Whitehead, speculation is a method. (Debaise 2006) 
As a method of posing ‘good’ questions - i.e. inquiring into what a situation is composed of; 
how its different elements relate and matter; and where the situation might lead in its 
implications - it should be clear that speculating is very different from what is commonly 
understood by interpreting. Interpretation presupposes that a given situation is exterior from, 
and unaffected by, its interpreter. It implies that the situation is a state of affairs out there, and 
that the interpreter asks what meaning should be given to that situation. People often say that 
such-and-so is a ‘matter of interpretation,’ which is often a way to avoid asking more 
compelling questions about that situation. Speculation, on the other hand, hinges upon the 
mutual definition of the components of a situation and those who speculate with it. Posing 
speculative questions does not leave the situation unaffected, and one cannot but involve 
oneself in a situation, become part of it in a way, in order to speculate. Consider again the 
example of painting animals as it is approached by Vinciane Despret. Looking at a situation 
made up of animals, humans, audiences, pencils and yet other elements, the question of how 
animals and humans can achieve things together opens up a perspective on relations that render 
those that are part of it capable of new things. The ‘essence’ of the beings in relation is not the 
issue, but the possibility of their mutual transformation is. Despret approaches the painting 
situation in such a way that its elements take on a compelling importance. The question of the 
paintings, in terms of an interspecies achievement, explores the boundaries of humanness and 
animal-ness, in the sense that our speculative question sets interspecies capabilities as a moving 
horizon – moved by the practice of painting - and not as a question that serves to decide whether 
the paintings are ‘real.’ Even human art comes to look different through this approach, and 
perhaps closer to the artists’ experience itself: aren’t they the first to claim that inspiration 
‘happened’ to them? Aren’t they the first to situate each artwork within a process that involves 
elements that moved them to create?  
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A key question in speculative thinking is: what might become possible? The difference 
between interpretation and speculation can be noticed here again. The question shifts from the 
interpretation of an event in terms of the fixed capabilities of animals (can or cannot really 
paint) to speculating with that event in order to ask what humans and animals might become 
capable of together. Research in ethology provides empirical evidence for the fact that 
addressing animals as intelligent beings gives entirely different results from traditional 
behaviorist approaches. When treated as intelligent beings, animals respond intelligently. It is 
like a self-fulfilling prophecy, except that we are not in the register of ‘prophecies’ but in a 
pragmatist mode of thinking, like the philosopher William James, evaluating ideas and 
concepts (not prophecies) in terms of their consequences. For example, assuming and soliciting 
intelligence in animals (and why not try humans?) obliges to rethink practices of breeding and 
keeping animals, and ecology more broadly. Speculation engages with the empirical, and 
indeed with reality, as a process that may take different directions. The difference between 
assuming a given world (‘open to interpretation’) or involving oneself in a speculative process 
where thinking and reality inform each other is not an epistemological difference (asking what 
knowledge is and what we can know), but it is a political one. If reality could be different, then 
how do we want it to be different? And what way of describing reality or a situation enables to 
think reality differently? A good example of this is the book Capitalist Sorcery: Breaking the 
Spell by Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers (2011). The book starts from a specific 
historical situation: the protests in Seattle against the WTO summit in 1999. Rather than 
explaining or interpreting the situation as a ‘case of’ something more general –protest from the 
masses, for example – Pignarre and Stengers look for inventive resources in order to transmit 
and relay these acts of resistance. The book does not develop any political programme but puts 
the question what our current political situation is composed of, and who ‘we’ are, to the fore. 
Asking these questions is in itself an act of resistance to ready-made problem-definitions about 
the ‘economy,’ for example, in mainstream media and politics. (see also Stengers 2015) 
Speculation has a political valence in that it resists theories that subtract things from the world 
instead of adding things. Such subtracting may happen for example by defining particular 
events or situations as ‘cases’ of something more general, thereby sterilizing the force that a 
situation, experience or event may have in obliging us to think. Speculation runs against the 
fitting of the world into an analytical grid and defining its elements – because analytical grids 
and theoretical frameworks are, in a sense, not analytical enough. They move too fast and 
conclude too quickly. That speculation is analytical, requiring care for concepts and technicity 
in writing, is particularly salient in both the content and writing style of feminist and science 
studies scholar Donna Haraway (2007). She constantly tries to unsettle our assumptions about 
the world ‘as it is’ by invoking pluralities where one tends to use a singular name; by the use 
of metaphors, tropes and seeming contradictions. Here, analysis does not serve the purpose of 
simplification and generalization but it serves to create new differences, like a prism breaking 
light. In Haraway’s speculative thinking, there is not one given world, but we are constantly 
making worlds. The question of who or what ‘we’ are, or could be, is part of that speculative 
endeavor.  
Is speculation then just a complicated way of saying: “The world is what we make of it?” If so, 
do we need speculative thought to tell us this? Wasn’t capitalism telling us that story already? 
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Let us be more analytic and pose better questions: who are ‘we,’ and which world(s) is one 
referring to in the phrase: “The world is what we make of it?” If you simplify and generalize 
‘the world’ as a set of resources to be exploited and transformed at will, then that is capitalism 
for you, and it is one particular and violent way of world-making indeed (if ‘making’ is still 
the appropriate term, rather than ‘destroying’). It is precisely this entrepreneurial violence that 
the thinkers referred to in this lemma want to move away from. And you can only move away 
from violent practices by acknowledging that violence is there in the first place. Stories about 
interspecies relations take on a particular edge here, and we can perhaps better understand why 
stories of dogs, pigs, cows and other species are so present in the texts of several of today’s 
speculative thinkers. The very fact that these animals and their stories seem so trivial with 
respect to ‘more serious’ scholarship about war, capitalism, and neoliberalism, indicates that 
one is dealing with a field of high political tension: “they are only pigs” because industrialized 
food production requires pork meat. Speculative thought ventures into those areas that are not 
considered an ‘option’ by those who want to keep dominant production systems running. In 
those production systems, animal and human intelligence are definitely not an option. Let alone 
the possibility to have more of it. With respect to such an economic and political status quo, 
stories about painting animals are as unruly as the cries of the protesters in Seattle. Speculation 
is a methodical rendering of the unruliness that pervades the world. An unruliness that obliges 
us to reconsider what we mean by the phrase: “The world is what we make of it.”  
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